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DEMOLISHING THE MYTH OF HOMOGENEOUS "ETHNIC"
BLOCKS – BOSNIA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE¹

More than a decade has passed since the war in Bosnia, and still people talk of a problem of ethnicity when trying to explain what happened between 1992 and 1995. The conflict was too difficult for many outsiders to understand, including Western politicians who had to deal with the situation. For simplicity's sake and because of the main protagonists' propaganda, this bloodshed has usually been termed an "ethnic war". But there was no ethnic conflict – because there are no ethnic groups. In order to underline this provocative conclusion, this chapter sheds light on the tools and different levels of contrast as well as on the influence of external ideas and powers on the Bosnian conflict. The arguments will be reinforced by means of a short cross-check with similar developments on the Indian subcontinent.

When it comes to defining "*Ethnien*", "*étnies*" or "*ethnic groups*" in the Balkans, the confusion is perfect. Sundhaussen concludes:

Slovenes and Croats belong to the same (Roman catholic) confession, however, they differ in their scripts. Croats and Serbs use the same (Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian) script, however, they belong to different confessions. The Bosnian Muslims differ from their contemporaries (Serbs and Croats) in confession only, whereas they differ from other Muslims in Yugoslavia (e.g. from the Albanians) in language and origin.

¹ For more information on the Indian/Pakistani case, see Carsten Wieland, «"Ethnic Conflict" Undressed: Patterns of Contrast, Interests of Elites, and Clientelism of Foreign Powers in Comparative Perspective – Bosnia, India, Pakistan», in *Nationalities Papers*, June 2001. See also Carsten Wieland, *Nation State by Accident: The Politicisation of Ethnic Groups and the Ethnification of Politics in Bosnia, India, Pakistan*, New Delhi 2004.

The Macedonians share with the Serbs the same Orthodox confession, however, they own an own script since the end of World War II. And insofar as the Montenegrins want to define themselves as a nation, they need in addition to language and faith (which they share with the Serbs) at least a further mark of distinction in order to underpin their autonomy (e.g. different historic traditions and social forms of organization)².

A similar mess applies to India, except that the terminology is different. It is about "communities" and "communal conflict". They equally represent a whirlpool of different cross-cutting cleavages like religion, language, customs, caste or race. Manor dismantles the confusion: ethnicity in India means 1) religion: above all, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; 2) language: at least nine main tongues and countless others; 3) so-called outcasts and scheduled tribes outside Hindu society; 4) racially distinct tribes: in the Himalayas and in the north-eastern mountains; 5) "Arians" and "Dravidians", dividing the subcontinent in north and south along the regional cleavage of the antique Indo-European and Dravidian languages³.

In other words, the phenomenon of so-called ethnicity, displayed in such a complex variety and cross-cutting cleavages, is not fit for political conflict and nation-building. Already Max Weber discerned in 1921: "For every really exact study [the term «ethnicity»] is a totally useless collective name"⁴. The present scientific debate has not come to grips with this term either. There is no widely respected definition, neither in the field of ethnology, nor in that of politics, history or international law. The same problem exists with the term "nation".

The traditionally competing concepts of ethnicity and nation lie far apart:

1. *Primordial* or *tribalist* approaches take an ethnic group – however it may be defined – as a social fact *a priori*, something which was revealed by science after its existence. Primordial factors like origin, language, religion, skin color, tradition (from clothes to cooking recipes) and/or the belonging to a diffusely (not yet territorially) defined land determine human beings by and since birth. Those who share these factors are supposed to be bound to each other affectively. Nobody can escape his ethnic ascription; it is *objective*. Ethnic groups in this sense are rather solid unities. In comparative politics they can thus be used as independent variables which influence political outcomes⁵.

² Sundhaussen, Holm, *Experiment Jugoslawien: Von der Staatsgründung bis zum Staatszerfall*, Mannheim, 1993, p. 12.

³ Manor, James, «"Ethnicity" and Politics in India», in *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1996, pp. 460-1.

⁴ Weber, Max, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, 1921, p. 242.

⁵ Representatives of the primordial approach are, for example, Shils, S.E., «Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties» (first published in 1957), in Shils, S.E. (ed.), *Center and Periphery: Essay in Macrosociology*, Chicago-London, 1975; Geertz, Clifford, «The Integrative Revolution:

2. With *situative, constructivist* or *instrumentalist* approaches, a common origin of people recedes into the background or is dismissed from the beginning⁶. In the extreme case, an ethnic group is just that as what it sees itself or as what it is seen from the outside. This is why Kaschuba calls it a "fictitious reality" or a powerful "ideal"⁷. Others refer to it as a "world of senses" or a "structure of relevance" which competes with other symbolic systems⁸. When and if people appeal to common characteristics, it depends on the social, political or economic situation. It is by no means inevitable⁹. According to needs, certain characteristics are emphasized in order to compete with other associations. The ascription is subjective. As Cohen coined it: "People can think themselves into difference"¹⁰. Ethnic groups in this sense are flexible and can almost be compared to interest groups. They are primarily a product of exterior influences and therefore can be seen as a dependent variable.

Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States» in Welch, C.E. jr. (ed.), *Political Modernisation*, (2nd ed.), Belmont, 1971; and Geertz, Clifford, (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York, 1963; Berghe van den, Pierre L., *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, New York u.a., 1981, and Berghe van den, Pierre L., «Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective», in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, No. 1, 1978; Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca-New York, 1983; and Gellner, Ernest, «Nationalism», in Weidenfeld, George and Nicholson, Nigel (eds.), *Thought and Change*, London, 1964. Ganzer, Burkhard, «Zur Bestimmung des Begriffs der ethnischen Gruppe», in *Sociologus*, No. 40, 1990; Robinson, Francis, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923*, Delhi, 1993; Weithmann, Michael W. (ed.), *Balkan-Chronik: 2000 Jahre zwischen Orient und Okzident* (2nd ed.), Graz-Wien-Köln, 1997.

⁶ Representatives of this approach are, for example: Deutsch, Karl W., *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (2nd ed.), Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1966; Horowitz, Donald L., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, 1985; Brass, Paul R., *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, Cambridge, 1974; Cohen, Anthony P., *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, London-New York, 1985; Okamura, J.Y., «Situational Ethnicity», in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, No. 4, 1981; Banton, Michael, «Rational Choice Theories», in *American Behavioral Scientist*, No. 38, 1995; Olzak, Susan, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*, Stanford, 1992; Reiterer, Albert F., «Die politische Konstitution von Ethnizität», in Seewann, Gerhard (ed.), *Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa*, München, 1992; Thapar, Romila, *Interpreting Early India*, Oxford-New York-Delhi, 1992; Panikkar, K.N., *Communal Threat and Challenge*, Madras, 1997; Engineer, Ashgar A., *Communalism in India: A Historical and Empirical Study*, New Delhi, 1995, and Engineer, Ashgar A., *Ethnic Conflict in South Asia*, Delhi, 1987; Phadnis, Urmila, *Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia*, New Delhi, 1990; Kaschuba, Wolfgang (ed.), *Kulturen – Identitäten – Diskurse: Perspektiven Europäischer Ethnologie*, Berlin, 1995, and Kaschuba, Wolfgang, «Identité, altérité et mythe ethnique», in *Ethnologie française*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1997; Habermas, Jürgen, «Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat», in Taylor, Charles (ed.), *Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung*, Frankfurt/M., 1993.

⁷ Kaschuba, Wolfgang, «Identité, altérité et mythe ethnique», cit., pp. 502, 508.

⁸ Reiterer, Albert F., «Die politische Konstitution von Ethnizität», in Seewann, Gerhard (ed.), *Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa*, cit. p. 38.

⁹ Brass, Paul R., *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, cit., pp. 119-20 and Manor, James, «"Ethnicity" and Politics in India», cit., pp. 459-60 in relation to India.

¹⁰ Cohen, Anthony P., *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, cit., p. 118.

Elwert represents an important exception. Although ethnicity is to him a (European) construction, he does not see any space for subjective ascription. Ethnicity, he says, has been invented by colonial scientists who imposed their scheme on indigenous people¹¹. Also Huntington takes this ascription – which he calls “tribalism” – for a modern product¹². For most constructivists, the belief in community is important, as J.S. Mill¹³ and Weber¹⁴ already stated. Many scholars agree today. Sabrina Ramet defines the term ethnicity in relation to the Bosnian Muslims (or Bosnjaks¹⁵) as “a group of people who believe that they constitute a primary cultural unit and who believe that they have common cultural interests”¹⁶. Brass argues equally for the Indian case¹⁷.

3. Neither the primordialist nor the constructivist approaches describe the phenomenon satisfactorily. Primordialists determine ethnic groups as fixed. They cannot explain why some ethnic groups decay, some appear anew and others merge. Neither can they tell us why some characteristics seem more important than others and why some ethnic groups (seemingly as a whole) fight each other and others co-operate. Constructivists tend to neglect the factor of origin. Thus they may not be able to delimitate ethnic groups from other social categories. This approach gets into trouble when it comes to explaining why masses tend to be mobilized so easily with appeal to origin and culture, and why people are even ready to die without any material rewards.

Therefore, most scholars nowadays support a *mixed version*¹⁸. Brass, for

¹¹ Elwert, Georg, «Nationalismus und Ethnizität: Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen», in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Vol. 41, 1989; similarly: Oommen, T.K., *Alien Concepts and South Asian Reality: Responses and Reformulations*, New Delhi-Thousand Oaks-London, 1995.

¹² Huntington, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven-London, 1968, p. 38; similarly: Heine, Peter and Stipek, Reinhold, *Ethnizität und Islam: Differenzierung und Integration muslimischer Bevölkerungsgruppen*, Gelsenkirchen, 1984, pp. 15-6.

¹³ Mill speaks of “feeling of nationality”, see Mill, John Stuart, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, edited by John Gray, London-New York 1991, (Considerations on Representative Government, chap. XVI: Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative Government [1861], p. 427). He defines the term “nationality” with constructivist connotations.

¹⁴ Weber spoke of an “artificial” kind of belief in ethnic community” (Weber, Max, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, cit., p. 237). On Weber and ethnicity, see: Stone, John, «Race, Ethnicity, and the Weberian Legacy», in *American Behavioral Scientist*, No. 38, 1995.

¹⁵ The term “Bosnian Muslims” has been kept here, although, after the Bosnian war in the 1990s, the term “Bosnjak” has prevailed. In this context, however, the new name would complicate the terminology. For Bosnian Muslims are referred to in a more general time frame, not only after 1993, when the General Bosnjak Assembly opted for the name “Bosnjak”.

¹⁶ Ramet, Sabrina P., «Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia’s Muslims, Reconsidered», in *South Slav Journal*, Vol. 13, Nos. 1-2, 1990, p. 2 (emphasis added).

¹⁷ Brass, Paul R., *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi, 1991, p. 70.

¹⁸ The most eminent representative is Smith, Anthony D., «Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism», in *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1996;

example, has shifted from a purely instrumentalist view in his earlier works to a mixed approach, which he resumes as follows: “[E]lites and counter-elites within ethnic groups *select aspects of the group’s culture*, attach *new value and meaning* to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups”¹⁹. Whereas Brass still tends more to the instrumentalist side, Anthony Smith is an eminent scholar who emphasizes more the primordial aspect²⁰.

Most representatives of the mixed approach hold that ethnicity has not been there forever but that it must be invented and formed. During this process, however, “old material” is used selectively. This is particularly clear when past events are interpreted and appropriated selectively and finally sold as “common history”.

The situative-primordial approach allows to treat ethnicity as an independent as well as a dependent variable. The question of whether ethnic groups are something old or new appears in a new light if one applies societal modernization as an independent variable to ethnicity as a dependent variable. There are two strings of argumentation:

1. Liberals, functionalists and Marxists alike – in a rare sense of harmony – hold that ethnic groups wear out in the process of modernization²¹. It does not matter whether these groups are viewed as primordial or as artificial realities. Primordialists and constructivists are in the same boat here, too²².

2. Pluralists, for example, say that ethnicity has not been weakened but strength-

Smith, Anthony D., *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge, 1995; Smith, Anthony D. (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Leiden-New York-Köln, 1992. Brass in his later works (like 1991) drifts from an instrumentalist to a mixed approach. Freitag observes the Indian cow protection movements, see Freitag, Sandria, *Collective Action and Community*, Berkeley, 1989.

¹⁹ Brass, Paul R., *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, cit., p. 75 (original emphasis).

²⁰ Smith, Anthony D., «Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism», cit., p. 445ff.

²¹ Gellner, Ernest, *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford-Cambridge (Mass.), 1994, p. 34ff points to the fact that Marxists and Liberals are subject to the same error: they have underestimated the force of ethno-nationalism.

²² Like the primordialist Geertz (see Geertz, Clifford, «The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States», cit.; and Geertz, Clifford, (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, cit.) and the constructivists Hobsbawm and Ranger (see Hobsbawm, Eric J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge, 1990; Hobsbawm, Eric J.-Ranger, Terence (eds.): *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 1983). On the Marxist approach, see: Solomos, John and Back, Les, «Marxism, Racism and Ethnicity», in *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 38, 1995; Panikkar, K.N., *Communal Threat and Challenge*, cit.; and Panikkar, K.N. (ed.), *Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture*, Delhi, 1991, and Panikkar, K.N., *Culture and Consciousness in Modern India*, New Delhi, 1990. On the discussion, see: Ramet, Sabrina P., «Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia’s Muslims, Reconsidered», cit.

ened by modernization. Under these circumstances only could this principle of social organization thrive and evolve as a political factor²³. This implies that ethnic groups change consistently through modern influences. Consequently, the constructivist view prevails here. As a special case – if not entirely deviating but supplementary – Gellner argues that nation-building, as a highly developed form of social organization, helps primordial factors (above all language) to gain new importance²⁴.

This short summary of common approaches shows how difficult it has become to boil them down to a single and respected definition of ethnicity. It becomes even more complicated if one adds another factor: ascription. Subjective and objective ethnic ascription crosscuts the theories and splits them once again. There are unsolvable tensions between the characteristics subjective/objective, dependent/independent variable and the common classification of primordial/constructivist. The following table gives an idea about the ideal types of the different versions:

Table 1.

Approaches	Ascription: subjective	Ascription: objective	Ethnic group as dependent variable	Ethnic group as independent variable	Ethnic group strengthened or formed by modernization	Ethnic group weakened by modernization
Conclusions						
Primordial	-	+	-	+	..***	+
Constructivist	+	-*	+	-	+	..**
Primordial - Constructivist	+	+	+	+	+	+

+ = typical/frequent; - = atypical/rare
 * = exception: Elwert; ** = exception: Marxists, functionalists, Hobsbawm; *** = exception: Gellner

²³ Kohn, Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism*, Toronto, 1969 (New York, 1944) is the most eminent scholar to defend this thesis. Also Elwert, Georg, «Nationalismus und Ethnizität: Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen», cit.; Anderson, Benedict R., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London-New York, 1991; Heckmann, Friedrich, *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation: Soziologie interethnischer Beziehungen*, Stuttgart, 1992; Reiterer, Albert F., «Die politische Konstitution von Ethnizität», in Seewann, Gerhard (ed.), cit.; Habermas, Jürgen, «Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat», in Taylor, Charles (ed.), cit.. Some of the debates are displayed well by Ramet, Pedro, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983*, Bloomington, 1984. Also Deutsch, Karl W., *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (2nd ed.), cit., forms part of this approach with his theory of social communication.

²⁴ Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, cit. Gellner does make clear that he does not defend the view of an “awakening” of nations but the constructivist approach of a new form of social organisation. However, he starts from primordial elements (language, literature) as indepen-

In addition to this variety of interpretations, yet another incongruity occurs: to what extent does an ethnic group consist of politics? This question is far from solved. A. Smith, for example, already links ethnicity to a fixed and clear-cut territory. He defines ethnic community (or “*éthnie*”) as “a named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and elements of common culture with a link to a *specific territory* and a measure of solidarity”²⁵. Dipankar goes even further. She links ethnicity to an entitlement of sovereignty²⁶. By contrast, Reiter holds that territory has nothing to do systematically with the ethnic concept. Territory gains importance only when other factors of nation-building have set in²⁷. Deutsch also argues that the idea of territory is a political projection: “No person can be born at more than one spot on the map. The actual place of his birth has the size of a bed or a room, not the size of a country”²⁸.

The more political entitlements are added to the notion of ethnicity, the less it can be distinguished from what is called a “nation”. In order to distinguish an ethnic group it should be seen as a *pre-political* association of people who settle on a certain soil which is not subject to political philosophy. At the other extreme, the notion of a “holy land” is, by contrast, a monstrous product of a rather advanced stage of political nation-building.

The confusion about the term ethnicity has become too great as to be useful for scientific research. The variety of case studies also makes ethnicity useless. If one takes a wide angle, it is too spongy to explain things. If one narrows the definition in order to avoid contradictions, the description will serve for a single case only and will lose explanatory power. Above all, a pre-political definition – as it should be for clarity’s sake – bars the way to a seamless transition towards the process of so-called nation-building, which is, first of all, a political endeavor.

Having in mind Manor’s description of the Indian ethnic map, it is not surprising that doubts about the usefulness of the term “ethnic group” come primarily from the subcontinent. Urmila Phadnis, for example, calls the term “unscientific”. Its use is only justified by the fact that it covers the complexity of cases and that there is no alternative²⁹. Similarly, Romila Thapar says that “tribe” in the ethnic sense has become too politicized and too broad. As an alternative she

dent variables which are used in the process of nation building. From this point of view he criticises the philosopher Immanuel Kant who, as Gellner says, defends a “bloodless” approach detached from any tradition. Gellner holds that with Kant’s concept there could never be any nation-building (pp. 130-2).

²⁵ Smith, Anthony D., «Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism», cit., p. 447 (emphasis added).

²⁶ Gupta, Dipankar, *The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in a Comparative Perspective*, Oxford-New Delhi, 1997, p. 6.

²⁷ Reiter, Norbert, *Gruppe, Sprache, Nation*, Wiesbaden-Berlin, 1984, p. 346.

²⁸ Deutsch, Karl W., *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (2nd ed.), cit., p. 18.

²⁹ Phadnis, Urmila, *Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia*, New Delhi, 1990, p. 241.

offers the term “lineage”, which covers origin, social and economic factors³⁰. It is clear, however, that by family bonds in the real sense it is hard to build nations with clear political ambition, notion of a wider territory, and an increasing degree of political mobilization.

We therefore have a dilemma: on the one hand, ethnic characteristics in their traditional sense are operationable only by the cost of their deformation. On the other hand, the whole world talks of “ethnic conflicts”. How does this go together?

Political protagonists who refer to “ethnic conflicts” do not refer to the diffuse expressions of various primordial factors. They claim that, indeed, ethnic groups as clear-cut and solid wholes fight each other. This is nonsense, of course, in the Balkans, in India and anywhere else. Since the term “ethnic group” is used by the protagonists of “ethnic conflicts”, it makes sense to stick to the term, as bad as it may be. Otherwise scholars will drift away from political reality. The task must be rather to fill the term with a different meaning and to reveal the protagonists’ eyewash.

1. *Patterns of Contrast*

The new term of “ethnic group” – in quotation marks only – is of systematic rather than historic nature. It is a *concept of action*, grounded on the definition that *one* primordial characteristic is taken out as the main means of contrast against “the others”³¹. It is too weak, however, to mobilize the people who share this characteristic against those with a different one. Cross-cutting cleavages prevent a strong group-feeling from having political potential, as mentioned above. In order to mobilize the people anyway, other primordial components are settled around the central element. These secondary characteristics are bent accordingly, overemphasized or constructed *ex-post*.

So this concentric concept of “ethnicity” has an epicenter around which other contrasts are brewed by means of subsequent and additional attributes. Determining such an “ethnic center” is not only a selection in order to strengthen a group, but it is also a pre-selection for a unilateral adjustment of the group which serves as its indispensable self-definition. Only in this way can a political constituency be created – and this is necessary for the project of “ethnic nation-building”.

In the Balkans and in India’s communal struggle, the primary characteristic is religion, which is taken up by political activists to contrast the “opposing

³⁰ Thapar, Romila, *Interpreting Early India*, cit., p. 117.

³¹ In rare cases it can be also more than one element. For example, in Sri Lanka, religion and language mostly overlap with Sinhalese and Tamils. Both factors serve as primary contrasts. But this does not change the structure of “ethnicity” as described.

camp”s”. This is why churches and religious leaders play such an important role³². Those who believed in Islam were defined – against many contradictions – as an “ethnic group” in contrast to other “ethnic groups” like Catholics, Orthodox, or Hindus.

The newly-defined term “ethnicity” solves the problem of diverging terminology in the Bosnian and in the Indian cases. An “ethnic group” thus defined is the same as a “community” in the Indian context³³. The statements of Sundhaussen on the Balkan case and Manor on India show that ethnic groups – without quotation marks – are fuzzy and more difficult to determine. A Muslim Bosnian shares a lot with his Orthodox and Catholic Bosnian neighbors, including their dialect. Likewise an Indian Hindu from Punjab has more in common (language, customs, etc.) with his Muslim and Sikh neighbors than with his fellow believers in Tamil Nadu. In Pakistan, ethnic sentiments (e.g. of region or language) run counter to the “ethnic” notion of a Muslim homeland.

Although the concept of “ethnicity” – with quotation marks – is flexible and strategic, it does not dismiss primordial resources which other social categories, like interest groups, cannot offer. For it appeals to resources which are present *a priori* and in person. They don’t have to be put together painstakingly by political discourse and consensus-building. A long process of opinion-making is not necessary. This explains why the “ethnic” paradigm helps create a mobilizing advantage in times of a poor democratic discourse, like during the first free elections in post-communist Yugoslavia or under the colonial cover in India. Primordial characteristics are hooks onto which political projects can easily latch.

The late member of the Bosnian presidency, Alija Izetbegović, must have had this phenomenon in mind when he said: “When you call for a public debate on democracy, a few hundred intellectuals will come. When it’s about nationalism, you will get tens of thousands of all social layers into the streets”³⁴.

³² On the role of the churches and Balkan nationalisms: Cohen, Lenard J., «Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation», in *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997; Okey, Robin, «State, Church and Nation in the Serbo-Croat speaking Lands of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1850-1914», in Kerr, Donal A. (ed.), *Religion, State and Ethnic Groups*, in: *Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940*, Vol. II, New York, 1992; Ocirk, Drago, «Les religions dans les relations interethniques: Le cas Yougoslave», in Devetak, Silvo, Flere, Sergej, Seewann, Gerhard (eds.), *Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas (Small Nations and Ethnic Minorities in an Emerging Europe)*, München, 1993.

³³ For definitions of *community* and *communalism* see: Thapar, Romila, *Interpreting Early India*, cit., p. 61; Chandra, Bipan, *Communalism in modern India* (2nd ed.), New Delhi, 1987, p. 1ff; Engineer, Ashgar A., «India at Fifty: Fault Lines in Two-nation Theory», in Grover, Verinder and Arora, Ranjana (eds.), *Pakistan: Fifty Years of Independence. Vol. II: Independence and Beyond: The Fifty Years: 1947-1997*, New Delhi, 1997, p. 6; Dixit, Prabha, *Communalism: A Struggle for Power*, New Delhi, 1974, p. 1; Panikkar, K.N., *Communal Threat and Challenge*, cit., p. 67.

³⁴ Quoted from: Beyme, Klaus von, *Systemwechsel in Osteuropa*, Frankfurt/M., 1994, p. 127.

2. Diagram of Terminology

The terminology can be summed up as a logical, interlaced chain:

ethnic group = a group of people whose descent can be considered as "common" in relation to its societal value. Customs, language, religion etc. are additional group features. The primordial elements are diffuse and exist in different expressions. They don't have to occur all at once. The borders around the ethnic groups are tendentially fluid. Cross-cutting cleavages and syncretisms are possible. Each ethnic group is unique in its historic setting.

religion + x = "ethnic group"

x can be: language, history, symbols, customs etc. These secondary features are all added, overvalued or constructed *ex-post* in order to strengthen religion, the primary feature (ethnically), against the opposing group which is constructed in the same way. "Ethnic group" is a situative concept of contrast. It is not individually and historically embedded. The borders of "ethnic groups" are tendentially sharp and impermeable.

In other cases, the formula can be: language + *x* = "ethnic group" or other combinations.

"ethnic group" + x = ethno-nation/community

x are: political, social and economic ambitions, striving for self-determination and possibly a state whose borders are supposed to overlap the land settled by the "ethnic group". In *x* there are political dynamics and a degree of organization. The ethno-nation is, at the same time, the presumed group to which ethno-nationalists appeal. They appear as a political action group. As spokesmen of the "ethnic group", they mobilize their resources (religion + *x*) and achieve *political* results. It is unnecessary, and even impossible, that all members of the "ethnic group" are mobilized. There is always a discrepancy between those who share the group features and those who act in their name.

The term "ethnic conflict" must therefore be called, correctly, ethno-national conflict.

nation = ethno-nation or civic-democratic nation = German or French nation-concept = objective or subjective assignment of "ethnic" features.

ethno-nationalism/communalism = ideology and political phenomenon on an ethno-national basis.

"nation-state" = state according to the construction-plan of the ethno-national or civic-democratic nation concept.

However, the term is mostly used to mean the final success and almost unreachable ideal of a state in the ethno-national paradigm. The correct term would be: ethno-national state. The shorter term "nation-state" is still applied by ethno-national activists.

A look on the term "nationalism" makes clear how important a clear-cut terminology is. The following table looks at content and function of nationalism in the Balkans and on the Indian subcontinent.

The dual character of nationalism, ideal types:

Table 2.

According to function / According to content	Emancipatory	Integral
civic-democratic (in India: nationalism)	Indian independence movement (Nehru/Gandhi)	-
ethno-national (in India: communalism)	Pakistan-movement (Jinnah)	Balkan nationalisms*, today's Pakistani and Hindu-nationalisms

* Above all, after the second World War. Earlier Balkan nationalisms in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires also had some emancipatory traits, if no particular aims of reform or modernisation.

In the Balkans and in India, spokesmen of "ethnic groups" have engaged in a race to strengthen religion with other primordial elements in order to avoid an appropriation by "the others". The following section will look at the components of ethno-nationalism in Bosnia and in India with respect to Pakistan.

3. The Construction of the "Ethnic" Idea

3.1. History

In the Balkans and on the Indian subcontinent, myths have been created in order to establish the notion that a group of people who share the same belief are more than a religious community, but an "ethnic" one. The hijacking of history serves to create a "common descent" for those with the same faith.

For this purpose, spokesmen of Bosnian Muslims air the Bogumil myth whenever they intend to contrast themselves to the further-advanced nation projects of Serbia and Croatia³⁵. The idea is that today's Bosnian Muslims derive their descent directly from the medieval Bosnian nobility. Allegedly, this nobility had established its own identity through the Bogumil church, which resisted Orthodox and Catholic appropriations. After the Ottoman conquests in 1463 and 1482,

³⁵ Fine, John V., «The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society», in Pinson, Mark (ed.), *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1994, p. 11ff; Miedlig, H.-Michael, «Zur Frage der Identität der Muslime in Bosnien-Herzegowina», in *Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Fremde Wege – Eigene Wege*, Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte, Berlin 1994, p. 26ff; Höpken, Wolfgang, «Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime», in Kappeler, Andreas, Simon, Gerhardt, Brunner, Georg (eds.), *Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien: Identität, Politik, Widerstand*, Köln, 1989, p. 181ff.

the Bosnian and Herzegovinian nobles readily and altogether converted to Islam, so the myth goes. With them the mostly Bogumil Bosnian peasants converted *en masse*, too, and became the social pillars of Ottoman rule. In this view, the “ethnicity” of Muslims in Bosnia is older than their religion.

The Yugoslav communist historian Atif Purivata propagated this version in his early writings to underpin that the Bogumils represented “the nucleus of Muslim nation-building”³⁶. Not coincidentally, he raised his voice at a time when in 1968 the Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia were granted the suffix “in the national sense” and in 1971 their status of a “nation” was written into the constitution.

The Bogumil myth has been convincingly refuted by recent research³⁷. Shortly before his death, also Purivata has softened his stand on this issue³⁸. According to the new findings, the Bogumil church as well as the Bosnian state had been in decay before the Ottoman invasion, Bosnian nobles were of various origins, members of all religions converted to Islam, conversions took place step-by-step rather than *en masse*. Some scholars even doubt if the Bosnian church was Bogumil at all³⁹.

In India, similar myths try to attach “ethnicity” to religion by historic twists. Hindu ethno-nationalists claim that the Brahmans descend from the Aryan tribe which allegedly migrated from central Asia to northern India around 1500 before the common era and conquered the high civilizations of the Indus valley⁴⁰. This is intended to make of every non-Hindu an “ethnically” or even racially distinct person. Accordingly, India is the “holy land” of Hindus. It is clear, however, that Muslims in India are almost all converted locals of Hindu belief. The Muslim side also uses myths to distinguish itself “ethnically” from the rest. Pakistani ideologues try to explain the foundation of the proclaimed Muslim homeland as a

³⁶ Höpken, Wolfgang, «Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime», cit., p. 182. See also: Purivata, Atif, «On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina», in Blagojevic, Dusan (ed.), *Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia*, Belgrad, 1974, p. 307.

³⁷ Džaja, Srećko M., *Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina: Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463-1804*, München, 1984; and Džaja, Srećko M., *Die “Bosnische Kirche” und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, München, 1978; Birnbaum, Henrik, «The Ethno-Linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Herzegovina», in *Die Welt der Slaven*, 1987, No. 32; Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History* (2nd ed.), London, 1996.

³⁸ Purivata in an interview with the author in Sarajevo (27.06.2000). Purivata said that he acknowledges the recent research by Džaja and Balić. Today, he said, no scientist supports the Bogumil thesis in its pure version. “We could say: Most Bogumils accepted Islam”. Also Orthodox and Croats did. Purivata said that in the 1960s he only had available findings from the Yugoslav author Aleksandar Soloviev.

³⁹ More about this view in Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History*, cit., p. 27ff.

⁴⁰ See: Savarkar, V.D., *Hindutva: Who is Hindu?*, written and distributed in Delhi 1922, published in Delhi 1969; Golwalkar, M.S., *We or Our Nationhood Defined*, Bombay, 1938.

logical consequence of history. Various official history books localize the roots of Pakistan in the stone age, in the civilizations of Moenjodaro and Harappa, in the time of the birth of Islam on the Arabian peninsula, in the invasion of the first Muslim soldiers into Sind in the 8th century, etc⁴¹.

Looking at history through a rear-view mirror – in suitable sections – is an effective means to create a common identity and a instrumentalized self-image⁴². The imagined past is subject to selective appropriation in favor of new aims, as K.N. Panikkar puts it⁴³. The rear-view mirror is adjusted accordingly. Serbian and Croatian writers describe the time of the Ottoman Empire as the “dark age”, whereas some Muslim historians tend to glorify it. The function of myths is to homogenize the constituency. This can become necessary through ideological challenges (socialism, nationalism, etc.) or through the struggle for political resources against an ethno-national competitors. Wrong history is a constitutive component of nation-building, as Renan has stated:

L’oubli et je dirai même l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la formation d’une nation et c’est ainsi que le progrès des études historiques est souvent pour la nationalité un danger⁴⁴.

3.2. Language

The standardization of languages follows the same purpose. The Balkans and India/Pakistan are the only examples where language has been shaped *ex-post* to overlap with the ethnic center of religion. The idea behind “ethnicizing” languages is that people who think differently are supposed to speak differently as well. Language becomes more than an instrument of communication, it becomes an ethno-national feature, loaded with historic, political and cultural connotations. At the end of this process, the ideal is a “national language” in an ethno-national state.

Just because language becomes a *political* problem, linguistics does not matter much. In the case studies, all the ethno-national languages are so-called *Ausbausprachen* – languages shaped and standardized consciously by cultural and political motives, not by grammar⁴⁵. The German romantic philosopher Johann

⁴¹ An entertaining survey in Jalal, Ayesha, «Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining», in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1995, p. 78ff.

⁴² Thapar, Romila, *Interpreting Early India*, cit., p. 140.

⁴³ Panikkar, K.N., *Communal Threat and Challenge*, cit., p. 73.

⁴⁴ Renan, Ernest, «Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?: Discours et conférences. Paris 1887 [1882]. What is a Nation?», in Bhabha, Homi (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London, 1990, pp. 7-8, see also Hobsbawm, Eric J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, cit., p. 12.

⁴⁵ The concepts of *Ausbausprachen* and *Abstandssprachen* can be found in Katicic, Radoslav, «Serbokroatische Sprache – Serbisch-kroatischer Sprachenstreit», in Lauer and Lehfeld (eds.), 1995, p. 24.

Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and his ideas of "languages make nations" had a great impact on intellectuals in the Balkans and in colonial India⁴⁶. It would be a long story to outline the ethno-national separation of languages in both cases. A few hints should suffice here.

In the second half of the 19th century there was a real opportunity to come to a common standard language in the Balkans. The Serb linguist Vuk Karadžić had picked an east Herzegovinian sub-dialect (Ijekavian-Stokavian) as the "purest" Serbian which he intended to standardise. At the same time, the pan-Slavic Illyrian intellectuals of Croatia opted for the Stokavian dialect, too.

Ideological antagonisms, however, destroyed this illusory harmony. The Croatian spokesmen didn't want to be called "actual" Serbs, as Karadžić considered anyone who spoke his selected dialect. Neither did the Serb spokesmen like to be pocketed by Illyrian ideas. They suspected that the Catholic church would use pan-Slavism to convert the lost sons in the East. Hence, the Serbo-Croatian, Croato-Serbian – or whatever – language was split into "Serbian" with Cyrillic script and "Croatian" with Latin script.

Ironically, Karadžić's version did *not* prevail with the Serbs (who continued to speak Ekavian-Stokavian) but with the Croats. It is mostly the Muslims (and Serbs and Croats) of Bosnia-Herzegovina who speak Karadžić's favored Ijekavian⁴⁷. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, language has gained importance again. Bosnian Muslims are once more in the middle of the contrasting poles. Croatian nationalists appropriate them as "actual Croats" because they speak their dialect. Serb nationalists see them as "actual Serbs" because they speak Karadžić's "pure Serbian". Nationalist Muslims, for their part, have tried to enrich "their Bosnian" language with Turkish and Persian elements for contrast⁴⁸.

The Indian case follows the same pattern. Hindi and Urdu (Hindi-Urdu) belong to the eastern branch of the Indo-European language family. Brahmans standardized the idiom as classical Sanskrit in the fourth century before the com-

⁴⁶ More on Herder's reception in the Balkans: Sundhaussen, Holm, *Der Einfluß der Herder'schen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburger Monarchie*, München, 1973; Behschnitt, Wolf D., *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten, 1830-1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie*, München, 1980; Reiter, Norbert, *Gruppe, Sprache, Nation*, cit., p. 283, 386ff. On Herder's reception in India: Mehta, V.R., *Foundations of Indian Political Thought* (2nd ed.), New Delhi, 1996, p. 158ff, 187ff; Appadorai, A., *Indian Political Thinking: Through the Ages*, New Delhi, 1992, p. 219ff.

⁴⁷ On the inner-Serbian differences of language: Birnbaum, Henrik, «The Ethno-Linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina», cit., p. 2.

⁴⁸ On the escalating language struggle after the collapse of Yugoslavia: Thomas, in Thomas and Friman (eds.), 1996, p. 36. For Turkish elements in the Bosnian Muslim language, see: Dyker, David A., «The Ethnic Muslims of Bosnia: Some Basic Socio-Economic Data», in *Slavonic and East European Review*, No. 50, April 1972, p. 243; Birnbaum, Henrik, «The Ethno-Linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina», cit., p. 18; and Steindorff, Ludwig, «Von der Konfession zur Nation: Die Muslime in Bosnien-Herzegowina», in *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen*, No. 4, 1997, p. 288.

mon era. In the 18th century, Hindu writers mostly used the Devanagari script and tended to Sanskritize the vocabulary. Muslim writers tended to write in Persian-Arabic. But there were many cross-cutting examples, too. It was the British who engaged in the formal separation of the languages by promoting academic purity in literature: Hindi free of Persian, Urdu with as much Persian as possible. So Hindi became identified with Hindu and Urdu with Muslim⁴⁹.

3.3. Customs

A last example of shaping contrast is by means of re-interpreted and reinforced customs. In the 19th century in Bosnia and India, religion and custom went more and more together. At least, this was the proclaimed idea, which was not always practiced in strong consequence.

Conversions to Islam in Bosnia and India, as a rule, had been gradual. Missionaries and violence were rare⁵⁰. Old customs changed slowly in spite of changes of faith. In turn, religion did not create a new ethnicity in the traditional sense. Mutual acceptance of different customs was common in both cases. To what extent even syncretism could be observed in Bosnia is not entirely clear⁵¹. In India it is more obvious. Ex-Hindu Muslims still visited temples, avoided beef or sometimes shunned certain places if they had previously been Hindu "untouchables"⁵².

Cultural cleavages in Bosnia and India have been as cross-cutting as the linguistic ones described above. It was again *political* activists who sharpened the contrasts of customs. Conversions became political matters. Changing one's faith became equal to treason. It meant deserting one's "ethnic group". Believers became valuable assets for political spokesmen because they were their inalienable constituency in the "ethnic" paradigm⁵³. Small conflicts were blown

⁴⁹ See the language conflict in the United Provinces as described in: Brass, Paul R., *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, cit., p. 130ff.

⁵⁰ Except the forced conversion of young boys in Bosnia under Ottoman rule.

⁵¹ Algar, Hamid, «The Hamzeviye: A Deviant Movement in Bosnian Sufism», in *Islamic Studies-Special Issue: Islam in the Balkans (Islamabad)*, Vol. 36, Nos. 2-3, 1997, p. 243, says that syncretisms did not occur in Bosnia; Steindorff, Ludwig, «Von der Konfession zur Nation: Die Muslime in Bosnien-Herzegowina», cit., p. 288 observes the opposite. Steindorff's definition of syncretism is very wide and suggests that he rather means benevolent acceptance of other peoples' religious customs.

⁵² More about syncretisms in India: Singh, Yogendra, *Modernisation of Indian Tradition: A Systemic Study of Social Change*, Jaipur-New Delhi, 1996, pp. 79-80; Dixit, Prabha, *Communalism: A Struggle for Power*, cit., pp. 5, 20; Hasan, Mushirul, *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims from Independence to Ayodhya*, London, 1997.

⁵³ For example, in Bosnia, the alleged conversion of a girl mobilised Bosnian Muslim resistance movements against the Habsburgs: Babuna, Aydin, *Die nationale Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der österreichisch-ungarischen Periode*, Frankfurt M., 1996, p. 105ff; also: Dzaja (1994), p. 61; Pinson, Mark, «The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina

into epic proportions. Simple love dramas and family disputes got a religious-political colour. This happened to the 16-year-old Muslim girl Fata Omanovic from Mostar in 1899. After a quarrel with her parents she ran away to her Christian girl friend where she became a convert. Muslim activists sold it as a case of abduction and forceful conversion. They complained about a lack of religious education of the Muslim population and the overall "difficult position" of Muslims in the country. Finally, the Fata case united two rival Muslim opposition groups and forged a common movement for autonomy out of originally Herzegovinian separatist protests.

In the Indian case, Gandhi managed to (temporarily) merge the Hindu cow-protection movement and the Muslim Khilafat Movement which was a Sunni protest against the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 by the Turkish revolutionary Kemal Atatürk⁵⁴.

This shows very well how volatile and manipulable the issue of customs is. Customs and symbols were used to strengthen the religious contrast – and thus to create a constituency – for political reasons. This helped in paving the way to an "ethnic" notion of the nation.

4. External Powers and Clientelism

Bosnia and India have long been under "alien" rule – the rule of a group or structure (e.g. Yugoslavia) which is not an ethno-national competitor. The rulers had great influence in shaping or avoiding ethno-national camps. They constituted the platform to which ethno-nationalist leaders had to refer and on which political struggles were fought.

The Habsburgs, and later the international community during the Bosnian war, as well as the British in India, started out from the "ethnic" paradigm as described above. Respectively, they considered Serbs/Croats/Muslims in Bosnia, as well as Muslims/Hindus in India, as different, irreconcilable "ethnic groups", or even races, and acted accordingly. In both cases, they played them out against each other for their own purposes. Often this was also compounded with ignorance due to a historiography within the "ethnic" paradigm (communal history).

The views of the external actors resemble each other strikingly: "This is a country in which at least three religions and half a dozen ethnic groups have fought with each other for centuries". (U.S. Foreign Secretary Warren Christo-

Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1918», in Pinson, Mark (ed.), *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, cit., p. 99ff.

⁵⁴ On the Khilafat movement: Minault, Gail, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilisation in India*, New York-Delhi, 1982; Nanda, B.R., *Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism*, Bombay, 1989, p. 104ff.

pher on Yugoslavia, 1993)⁵⁵ – and "[W]e are confronted with the age-old antagonism of Hindu and Mohammadan, representatives not only of two religions but of two civilizations [...]". (Joint Committee of Indian Constitutional Reform, 1934)⁵⁶. Both views have clearly taken over the "ethnic" paradigm with religion as ethnocenter as described above.

In practice, the Habsburgs and British founded cultural institutes along supposed "ethnic" lines, promoted "ethnically" diverging languages, and created a party system which was prone to translate their assumptions directly into politics. This meant an ethno-national quota system and separate electorates in India. The quota system in Yugoslavia's political system was set up to guarantee proportional representation along "ethnic" lines. The communist party was split up according to ethno-national sub-republics. Career chances were dependent on "ethnic" origin. Political and societal conflicts were solved along "ethnic" lines as well⁵⁷. Laslo Sekelj concludes: "The gradual emergence of a plurality of power centers since the 1960s was not an aspect of political but of *national pluralism* [...]"⁵⁸.

Thus cross-cutting cleavages, respectively multi- or trans-"ethnic" parties, found no support within the political systems of colonial India and Yugoslavia. This left heavy traces after their collapse. Population censuses, in addition, served a political purpose and helped to categorize, and often to confuse, societal realities.

Under these circumstances, the different groups could not form a common political will. At the same time, however, with the break up of old structures a power struggle of elites began, and economic competition became more obvious. Yugoslavia and colonial India fell apart not because the ethno-national groups were incompatible, but because their elites could not find any power sharing arrangements.

In the time shortly before the break ups, foreign powers were very active in promoting ethno-national cleavages. For example, they supported ethno-national spokesmen far beyond the degree to which members of the proclaimed ethnonation backed them. Radovan Karadžić was courted as the "Serb leader", although he lacked the support of the majority of Bosnian Serbs, let alone Serbs all over the Balkans⁵⁹. Alija Izetbegović was seen to represent "the Muslim" side

⁵⁵ Press release, Washington, 10th of February 1993, in *Europa-Archiv*, 1993, p. D158.

⁵⁶ Report (session 1933-34), in Aziz (ed.), Vol. 1, 1986, p. 13.

⁵⁷ See: Calic, Marie-Janine and Perthes, Volker, «Krieg und Konfliktlösung in Bosnien und Libanon: Ein Strukturvergleich», in *Politik und Gesellschaft*, No. 2, 1995, p. 144ff. They compare the situation with Lebanon. See also the systematic approach of Sekelj, Laslo, *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration*, Boulder-New York, 1993; Goati, Vladimir, «The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: The Role of Political Elites», in *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997.

⁵⁸ Sekelj, Laslo, *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration*, cit., p. xxiii (original emphasis).

⁵⁹ More than half of the Bosnian Serbs emigrated or lived together with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the territory controlled by the government of Alija Izetbegovic (often rashly

although many other groups lived and chose to live in “the Muslim” territory, etc.. Mohammed Ali Jinnah emerged as the spokesman of “all Muslims” in India, although he only led one Muslim party out of many.

It does not matter here if the protagonists saw themselves accordingly. What matters is that their positions as ethno-national leaders were strengthened by the external actors who meddled in the affairs. Moreover, they accepted the territorial claims of the ethno-national spokesmen for “their” respective “ethnic group”. Once in the vicious circle of this paradigm, solutions were sought in the haggling about borders and territorial percentage points, in corridors, bridges and tunnels, so that the hostile “ethnic groups” would not get in touch with each other. “Ethnic” expulsions and millions of refugees are another consequence.

In an allusion to the catch-word of British policy in India, Kumar describes the policy of international actors during the Bosnian war as “divide and quit”⁶⁰. In turn, the British called their plan to split up India into supposedly “ethnic” units, the “Balkan Plan”⁶¹.

5. The Ethno-nationalists' Easy Success

The influence of foreign actors gives an answer to the question: why did ethno-national state building succeed, even though *not* all of the nation's members by far supported the project (in both India and Bosnia), and even though the ethno-national protagonists themselves did not back the project entirely (in Bosnia)?⁶² The projects succeeded without fulfilling Miroslav Hroch's conditions – the three stages of nation building as a gradual mass-mobilizing force⁶³.

The external forces were a catalyst for the success of ethno-national forces in the internal power struggle. Only few scholars have incorporated the external aspect in their definition of nation-building. One exception is Rupert Emerson who said: “The case of Pakistan came close to sustaining the theory that a nation is whatever can get away with establishing its claim to being one [...]”⁶⁴. This

referred to as the “Muslim government”). See: Wieland, Carsten, «Die aktuellen Konfliktlinien in Bosnien-Herzegowina», in *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen*, No. 3, 1995.

⁶⁰ Kumar, Radha, «Bosnia in the Annals of Partition: From Divide and Rule to Divide and Quit», in Hasan, Mushirul (ed.), *Islam, Communities and the Nation: Muslim Identities in South Asia and Beyond*, Delhi, 1998, p. 426.

⁶¹ Jalal, Ayesha, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Cambridge, 1985.

⁶² In both cases a Muslim “nation-state” was proclaimed (Pakistan) or came close to existence (Bosnia) although many Muslims did not support this idea. In Bosnia, Izetbegovic and his colleagues in the SDA were at least ambiguous about this concept. Wieland, 2000.

⁶³ Hroch, Miroslav, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, Cambridge, 1985.

⁶⁴ Emerson, Rupert, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African*

statement is important because it stresses both factors which are in dialectic relation: a) interests have to be articulated actively and effectively (no matter on what they are founded), and b) external authorities must accept these claims in some form or another. One who “gets away” with something has to manage to “get through” somewhere. Max Weber, too, already had both angles in mind. According to him, the term “nation” means that it “imposes on certain groups of people a specific notion of solidarity vis-à-vis others”⁶⁵.

Many authors ignore the external or “passive” aspect. Seton-Watson, for example, calls it a nation if “a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one”⁶⁶. Gellner, too, considers merely the “active” internal aspect. Recognition plays a part only among the members themselves: “Two men are of the same nation if and only if they *recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation”⁶⁷.

However, considering the nation-building in the Balkans and the Indian sub-continent, the internal aspect does not suffice to explain the political outcomes. Claims have to be heard in the world. If they are ignored, they often perish. If they are furthered they sometimes reach goals which even their own adherents did not believe possible. Founding a state is not easy, but full of obstacles, enemies and risks – it's often the last resort of political escalation⁶⁸. But for the British in India and the international community in Bosnia, ethno-national states somehow made sense because they were themselves thinking within the “ethnic” paradigm. In the Yugoslavian case, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the rise of ethno-nationalism in Eastern Europe, and German unification underpinned the trend of “one nation – one state” even at the end of the 20th century.

Significantly, in common use today, the notion of a “nation state” has become clearly loaded with ethno-national connotations. The so-called French version of a political, legal and civic nation has lost practical influence. Hence, the ideological background has become favorable for the ethno-national spokesmen. Hobsbawm also criticizes that “the states of the European Union at the beginning of the 1990s were involved equally in the destruction of Yugoslavia as Tito's heirs themselves”⁶⁹.

The confusion of state and (ethno-)nation has a long history. It went from the League of Nations to the United Nations, where *states* and *not nations* are

Peoples, Cambridge (Mass.), 1960, p. 92.

⁶⁵ Weber, Max, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 528 (original emphasis).

⁶⁶ Seton-Watson, Hugh, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, London 1977, p. 5.

⁶⁷ Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, cit., p. 7 (original emphasis).

⁶⁸ See also: Mayall, James and Simpson, Mark, «Ethnicity is not Enough: Reflections on Protracted Secessionism in the Third World», in Smith, Anthony D. (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Leiden-New York-Köln, 1992, p. 8.

⁶⁹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, «Die neuen Nationalismen», in *Die Zeit*, 06.05.1999.

members – although the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights confuse these terms more than once⁷⁰. What about peoples that are not considered nations, about nations that are not states, and about states that are not nations (which amounts to 96% of the population in the non-nation-states of this world)? There is no answer in international law. This makes minority issues and the concept of self-determination so tricky from Woodrow Wilson onwards. Nobody knows exactly what the “self” is that should determine itself⁷¹. Already in 1793 the French general Carnot warned: “If ... any community whatever had the right to proclaim its will and separate from the main body under the influence of rebels, etc., every country, every town, every village, every farmstead might declare itself independent”⁷².

The stakes are high but so are the gains. Ethno-national elites are lured to enhance their efforts for independence because political and economic resources are rich when the aim is reached. World politics works under the presumptions that: 1) states are the dominant actors in international relations, 2) states have the monopoly of power, and 3) conflicts and interventions are fought and settled on inter-state levels⁷³. Hence, Mayall and Simpson conclude:

The state is often a valued prize in the competition between opposing ethnic and/or religious groups. The winners gain monopoly access to the outside world and the ability, therefore, to extract a rent from foreign governments, or private investors, during the process of modernization. [...] In other words, both the heterogeneous nature of post-colonial society and the international environment provide a fertile soil in which separatism and secession can propagate and flourish⁷⁴.

⁷⁰ Article 4 of the UN Charter says: “Membership of the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states [...]”. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is defined as a measure for “all peoples and all nations” irrespective of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. *Charter*, 1993, p. 6 (emphasis added), *Universal Declaration*, 1993, pp. 6-7 (emphasis added).

⁷¹ Heintze, Hans-Joachim, *Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Minderheitenrechte im Völkerrecht: Herausforderungen an den globalen und regionalen Menschenrechtsschutz*, Baden-Baden, 1994, pp. 41ff, 187-8; Henkin, Louis, «The Mythology of Sovereignty», in Macdonald, R.S. (ed.), *Essays in Honour of Wang Teyea*, London, 1993; Kimminich, Otto, *Einführung in das Völkerrecht* (6th ed.), Tübingen-Basel, 1997, p. 114; Paech, Norman, «Minderheitenpolitik und Völkerrecht», in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 06.11.1998, pp. 19, 22.

⁷² Lazare Carnot (1753-1823) was also member of the French National Assembly during the Revolution (quoted from Emerson, Rupert, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, cit., p. 299).

⁷³ Mickey, Robert and Albion Smith, Adam, «Resolving Ethnic Conflict: A Rhetorical Intervention», in Devetak, Silvo and Flere, Sergej and Seewann, Gerhard (eds.), *Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas*, cit., p. 63.

⁷⁴ Mayall, James and Simpson, Mark, «Ethnicity is not Enough: Reflections on Protracted Secessionism in the Third World», in Smith, Anthony D. (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, cit., pp. 7-8.

Thinking in these categories, the former German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher tried to solve the Yugoslav conflict by upgrading the conflicting parties to subjects of international law, i.e. states. But after the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, no further step followed to solve the problems. Instead, they escalated into a new constellation with enhanced encouragement and military power. One should have learned from India and Pakistan: by founding a so-called Muslim “nation-state”, the quarrels between the proclaimed ethno-national camps have been far from over. On the contrary, the conflict has grown more heated with new reasons like disputed territory and new resources like national armies and even atomic bombs.

For this reason, modern scholars of international law have criticized the concept of sovereignty as outdated, dangerous, superfluous, diffuse, and normatively overloaded⁷⁵. The catastrophe in the Balkans in the 1990s has contributed to great skepticism of the classic notion of self-determination. In order to guarantee human rights in contrast to national rights, and in order to put a buffer between democratic self-determination and state building, the concept of “internal self-determination” has arisen. This means that states should be organized in such a way that willing minorities can determine their political fate within the existing state, which would make the concept of “external or offensive self-determination”, i.e. the founding of an ethno-national state, obsolete. In other words, a particular form of internal state organization becomes the precondition of its international recognition⁷⁶.

This was also the argument with which a military intervention in Serbia was justified during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. All these were lessons from the Yugoslav disaster. For, at that time, Croatia could declare itself independent with the backing of the European Community without guaranteeing minority-rights to its Serbian citizens⁷⁷. In turn, the Kosovo intervention sent a clear message to the Albanian minority: “We will help you, even with military means, but we won’t give you a perspective to have your own state!” This precondition is a valuable

⁷⁵ Henkin, Louis, «The Mythology of Sovereignty», in Macdonald, R.S. (ed.), *Essays in Honour of Wang Teyea*, cit. On the deconstruction of sovereignty in international law, see the arguments of Camilleri, Joseph A., «Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World», in Walker, R.B.J. and Mendlovitz, Saul H. (eds.), *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community*, Boulder-London, 1990. Kimminich, Otto, *Einführung in das Völkerrecht*, cit., p. 90ff. Sieyès had already warned of an overvaluation of the term sovereignty: see Dock, Adolf, *Revolution und Restauration über die Suveränität*, Aalen, 1972 [1900].

⁷⁶ On the internal right of self-determination, see Heintze, Hans-Joachim, *Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Minderheitenrechte im Völkerrecht: Herausforderungen an den globalen und regionalen Menschenrechtsschutz*, cit., pp. 84ff, 153ff.

⁷⁷ Although the Badinter commission had recommended to value minority rights higher than the right to statehood. Miedlig, H.-Michael, «Zur Frage der Identität der Muslime in Bosnien-Herzegowina», in *Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Fremde Wege – Eigene Wege*, cit., p. 120.

insight which could have prevented the explosive chain reaction that destroyed the Yugoslav concept of a *political* and *civic* state, which some forces, like the League of Communists and the Reformists under Ante Marković, still defended.

In Bosnia and colonial India, the separation plans along "ethnic" lines made it difficult for alternative forces to gain a political profile. In both cases one could say: "There are few rewards, if any, for those policy makers who really care for ethnic harmony [...]" (Rizman)⁷⁸.

6. Crumbling Contrasts

Foreign powers have influenced the outcome of the political struggle in Bosnia and India in favor of the "ethnic" paradigm. This is remarkable as such and perhaps disappointing. But it is even more striking that, in spite of this, the ethno-national frontlines crumbled quite rapidly afterwards. Or is it more appropriate to say: *because* of this? Two reasons can be put forward that explain the weakness of the "ethnic" concept and the short breath of ethno-national movements – one is external and one is theoretically inherent to the concept itself.

1. Since ethno-national cleavages were duplicated mentally and promoted actively by external actors, no broad mass movement was necessary in order to reach the final goal of an ethno-national state. The many existing contradictions – like the discrepancy between the action group and the members of the promoted "ethnic group", cross-cutting primordial factors and cleavages within the alleged "ethnic group" (ethnic factors against the "ethnic" concept), and the discord among the ethno-national spokesmen themselves – did not kill the project⁷⁹. Instead, the concept worked very well by tapping external resources.

Huntington argues this way, too. He holds that Pakistan got its statehood too easily. Jinnah's Muslim League could not form any mass appeal and remained with a thin social basis. Therefore, "in post-independence Pakistan the League lost both its constituency and its purposes"⁸⁰.

The Muslims in Bosnia have not formed a broad national movement either and, still, almost ended up in their "own" state – simply because the structure around them fell into pieces. One could speak of a *negative nation-building*.

⁷⁸ Rizman, Rudolf, «The Sociological Dimension of Conflicts Between Ethnonationalisms», in Devetak, Silvo, Flere, Sergej, Seewann, Gerhard (eds.), *Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten in Umbruch Europas*, cit., p. 305.

⁷⁹ Above all, in the Balkans in the first half of the 20th century, it was common that even representatives of ethno-national parties, mostly of "Muslim" parties, described themselves "ethnically" as Serb or Croatian. All different combinations were possible. Examples in: Ramet, Sabrina P., «Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia's Muslims, Reconsidered», in *South Slav Journal*, p. 10.

⁸⁰ Huntington, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, cit. p. 442.

Muslims in Bosnia, even after the war, have shown the strongest inclination of all "ethnic groups" to keep up the idea of a multi-"ethnic" state. They have also shown a variety of dogmatic and political approaches and are far from homogeneous⁸¹. This can be explained by a rather slow process of Muslim nation-building throughout history. For these standards, the opportunity of ethno-national statehood came rashly and too suddenly.

2. The second reason has to do with the idea of "ethnicity" itself. This action concept is ideologically thin and has nothing to offer except a notion of "ethnic" homogeneity, ethno-national competition or hatred, and the promise of one's "own" state with its political resources granted on the international platform. Emancipative ideas of societal or economic progress hardly exist. It was no coincidence that the party-programs of the ethno-national parties for the Bosnian elections in 1990 were much thinner than that of the alternative forces.

The advantage of "ethnic" action concepts is – as mentioned above – that they have a time lead in mobilizing people since they do not need discussions but latch onto primordial elements which seem ready and clear. But they turn out to be of use in a dynamic process only, i.e. on the way towards the maximum goal of an ethno-national state. Once this stage is reached, the ethno-national cleavage loses its meaning and purpose. For then, great parts of the ethno-national, hostile "camps" are fenced in by state borders. The "homogenized" interior does not hold long. Instead, other cleavages will emerge in the business of every-day politics.

This can be observed ideally in Pakistan: after Partition the ethnicenter "religion" crumbled and the ethnicenter of "language" took the lead. New contrasts have gained importance and influenced political outcomes. Intra-religious cleavages have sharpened, too. Confrontations between Sunnis and the Shia minority have become more and more frequent.

To a certain extent, this tendency can be also observed in Serbia and the Serbian parts of Bosnia, where "ethnic" harmony is far and political dissent strong. The Bosnian Muslim case has already been mentioned – the difference is, however, that there is not such a great discrepancy between claim and reality, since the goal of a Bosnian Muslim ethno-national state was neither fully clear nor strongly pursued.

The observations lead to the conclusion that, in the end, there cannot be such things as ethno-national states (commonly called "nation-states") at all. The "ethnic" cleavage becomes obsolete or the "ethnic" concept will die with its own "success" which is, in the final stage, the ethno-national state.

This is just the opposite of what John Stuart Mill once recommended: before democracy enters, society must be homogenized and develop a "harmony of

⁸¹ See tables.

feeling”⁸². If this were true, democracy and ethno-nationally heterogeneous states could not exist together. However, almost all people in the world live in heterogeneous states and more and more of them are democracies⁸³. Instead, as we have seen, if states are founded or do exist with the presumption of being ethno-nationally homogeneous, the democratic system furthers and helps display ethno-national heterogenization.

7. Breaking Out of the Vicious Circle

What happened in Bosnia and colonial India was actually the result of a “big mistake”. The error started to take hold in theory and later in practice. Internal and external actors fell prey to, or actively promoted, the notion that, first, clear-cut ethnic groups exist and, second, that they are politically incompatible. Primordially speaking, this was nonsense because ethnic features are spread diffusely and do not coincide with the proclaimed groups. Also politically, the cleavages were not that clear cut at all. Ethnic conflict did not exist. Instead, ethnic cleavages in the primordial sense (and political cleavages) ran counter to the “ethnic” concepts presented by cultural and political spokesmen who argued that Serbs, Croats, Hindus, and Muslims were indeed ethnic groups. To make their arguments more convincing, they searched for additional contrasts to the people’s beliefs, which they found in allegedly primordial features (language, customs, etc.) as well as in distorted historiography.

The findings herein constitute a recommendation to political actors – external ones and internal ones anyway – not to give way to ethno-national demands, neither symbolically, nor politically, nor institutionally. For this will start a vicious circle in which every further step to solve conflicts, including the drawing of borders, will be ever more tightly bound to the “ethnic” paradigm.

When conflicting parties speak of ethnic conflict, alarm bells should be ringing not only with politicians but also with journalists. This was not the case in the past. Instead, they adopted these ideas without scrutiny, which led to reporting and policy-outcomes that were located within the “ethnic” paradigm.

What this means for party systems is described by Horowitz: “Once ethnic politics begins in earnest, each party, recognizing that it cannot count on defections from members of the other ethnic group, has the incentive to solidify the support of its own group”⁸⁴. This has an escalating effect in sharpening political

⁸² Mill, John Stuart, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, cit., p. 434.

⁸³ This contradiction is mentioned in: Mayall, James and Simpson, Mark, «Ethnicity is not Enough: Reflections on Protracted Secessionism in the Third World», in Smith, Anthony D. (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, cit., p. 6; Rizman, Rudolf, «The Sociological Dimension of Conflicts Between Ethnonationalisms», in Devetak, Silvo and Flere, Sergej and Seewann, Gerhard (eds.), *Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas*, cit., p. 304.

⁸⁴ Horowitz, Donald L., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, cit., p. 318.

contrasts along ethno-national lines. Multi- and trans-“ethnic” parties will be ground between the millstones. The unbridgeable and exclusive friend-foe-scheme of Carl Schmitt⁸⁵ will be projected on the ethno-national camps. Political constituencies will become unmovable. The state will be paralyzed.

It is doubtful whether and when the ex-Yugoslavian states can break out of this vicious circle. There are encouraging signs. The biggest single steps were the death of Franjo Tudjman, the internal struggle of HDZ-hardliners in Croatia and Herzegovina, the election victory of non-ethno-national forces in Croatia at the beginning of 2000, and the successful anti-Milošević revolution in October 2000. Now in Bosnia, trans-“ethnic” parties are also a force to be reckoned with, despite their poor performance in the latest election in October 2002 (after their big success two years earlier).

The rise of alternatives in the Balkans depends largely on two dialectical factors.

1. The external actors, who once gave incentives to ethno-nationalists, must now turn to supporting multi- and trans-“ethnic” forces. New policy issues and cleavages beyond the ethno-national question can be promoted, among others, by economic progress and new foreign policy perspectives. This leads to the second point:

2. Non-ethno-national governments will profit from a realistic perspective of international partnership. The domestic political climate of Slovenia and Croatia has profited from the mere existence of the question of approaching the European Union, until Slovenia even entered it in 2004. For Croatia this may be a long-term perspective but it already helps to deviate the debates away from the single issue of ethno-nationalism.

The sphere of influence of this far-fetched aim also reached the Macedonian Republic before the parliamentary elections in 1998. All political parties – moderates or ethno-nationalist Macedonians and Albanians alike – supported the idea of approaching the EU. This was not for economic reasons only, but they also saw a possibility to break the vicious circle of ethno-nationalism. “We hope that the national element will get out of fashion with the abolition of borders in Europe”, said, for example, the head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)⁸⁶.

When ethno-national politics exists in an advanced stage, solutions are hard or impossible to find within the “nation-state” itself, despite varying institutional

⁸⁵ Schmitt, Carl, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Berlin, 1991 [1932].

⁸⁶ Angelka Peeva in an interview with the author in Skopje (18.11.1997). See also: Wieland, Carsten «Ein Makedonien mit drei Gesichtern: Innenpolitische Debatten und Nationskonzepte», in *Südosteuropa*, 1997, No. 12, p. 710. The author’s judgement is drawn from interviews with leaders of all important parties during the election campaign.

approaches⁸⁷. The reason is simple: ethno-nationalists have directed their projections and claims to the state level only. It is the very bone of contention. For, in the traditional view and in international law, the state is the only guarantor of respect and of political and economic resources. Therefore, in order to take the hot air out, it makes sense to get off this level and to open up another dimension.

The strongest alternative world-wide is the European Union in its present stage. Already five years after the war in Bosnia and in a more advanced stage of European integration, it has become much less likely that the member states would repeat their mistakes and pursue conflicting national foreign policies towards the war parties. Moreover, joining EU supra-state structures has become increasingly rewarding psychologically, politically and economically.

A well-known and quite ambiguous protagonist of the Bosnian war had recognised this option long ago. In the late 1960s Alija Izetbegovic said something remarkable which few people would associate with him at the first glance:

The creation of the European Economic Community – although this claim may seem unacceptable at first sight – constitutes the most constructive event in 20th century European history. And the establishment of this supranational structure was the first real victory of the European peoples over nationalism. Nationalism has become a luxury, a thing too expensive for small and even for medium-sized nations⁸⁸.

This shows that one will not find a common ground for ethno-nationalists on the one hand and promoters of civil-democratic societies on the other hand on questions related to the sub-state level, like primordialism and the existence, importance or nonsense of “ethnic groups”. This is also true for the state level, where the fight for resources is a zero-sum game. There is a chance, however, to get them together on supra-state perspectives. It is no coincidence that regionalists – the borderline between them and ethno-nationalists is sometimes fluid – in Italy, Spain or Northern Ireland are often enthusiastic spokesmen for European integration as well. This does not mean that such a perspective is a cure-all against ethno-national conflicts or “ethnic” constructions from the beginning. However, it is one possibility for creating a variety of policy issues which prevent the debate from narrowing down to this ideological simplicity with fatal consequences.

Since everything is a purely mental issue, it is important to create new worlds of experience – although ethno-national spokesmen claim, and too many believe

⁸⁷ For example, Lijphart's consociational model (Lijphart, Arend, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven-London, 1984 and Horowitz, Donald L., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, cit., recommendations for a modified majoritarian system.

⁸⁸ Izetbegovic, Alija, *The Islamic Declaration* (n.p. 1970) (*Islamska deklaracija*, Sarajevo, 1990), p. 53.

it, that “ethnicity” has something to do with real origin. As a last resort of argumentation one can look at anthropology: excavations of skulls and bones in the Balkans and on the Indian subcontinent don't reflect the “ethnic” cleavage at all⁸⁹. So it's not about what people are but what people think. Worlds of experience shape peoples' minds and, at one point, even take over the place of primordial factors. Terror, war, and rape have contributed to the conviction of many that “ethnic groups” cannot live together, although the strategies of a relatively few brutal activists have been laid bare⁹⁰.

These case studies of Bosnia and India lead to the following conclusion that is waiting to be tested in other areas: *Ethnic groups are not politically incompatible, but they are incompatible with politics*. If this insight descends from the sphere of academics to that of Western policy advisers and policy makers, it could give them a better grip on conflict-solving in modern times. Supranationality, devaluation of political sovereignty, conceptual separation of nation and state, and the consequent denial of ethnic conflict could bring about new worlds of experience, which may gradually influence views and finally political outcomes. This may open new doors in international politics at the beginning of the new millennium.

⁸⁹ For the Balkans, see: Mikic, Zivko M., «Die Ethnogenese der Slawen aus der Sicht der Anthropologie», in *Ethnogenese europäischer Völker*, Bernhard, Wolfram and Kandler-Palsson, Anneliese (eds.), Stuttgart-New York, 1986, p. 339; for the Indian subcontinent, see: Kennedy, Kenneth A.R., «Have Aryans been Identified in the Prehistoric Skeletal Record from South Asia?: Biological Anthropology and Concepts of Ancient Races», in *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia: Language, Material Culture and Ethnicity*, Erdosy, George (ed.), New Delhi, 1997, pp. 60-1.

⁹⁰ The strategies of rowdies, rapists and killers were very similar during the Bosnian war and the time of Partition in India. Examples on Bosnia, see: Thomas, in Thomas and Friman (eds.), 1996, pp. 135-6; Calic, Marie-Janine, *Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina: Ursachen, Konfliktstrukturen, Internationale Lösungsversuche* (2nd ed.), Frankfurt/M., 1996, p. 92ff; Morokvasic, Mirjana, «Krieg, Flucht und Vertreibung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien», in *Demographie aktuell*, No. 2, 1993 p. 13; Silber, Laura and Little, Alan, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, London, 1995, p. 269ff; Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History*, cit., pp. 216-7; On India, see Aziz (ed.), Vol I (1986), p. 349ff; Jalal, Ayesha, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, cit., p. 226. Systematically: Engineer, Ashgar A., *Communalism in India: A Historical and Empirical Study*, cit.; Brass, Paul R., «Introduction», in *Riots and Pogroms*, Brass, Paul R. (ed.), London, 1996.